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THE REUNIFICATION OF CHINA WITH HONG KONG
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR TAIWAN: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE "ONE COUNTRY, Two SYSTEMS" MODEL
Agnes J. Bundy*
INTRODUCTION
The Joint Declaration ratified by the governments of the United
Kingdom and the People's Republic of China' on May 27, 1985
signals the eventual transfer from British to Chinese sovereignty of
Hong Kong Island, Kowloon, and the New Territories.' Under this
Declaration, British sovereignty and jurisdiction over Hong Kong
will end in 1997, terminating the British occupation that began in
1842. When Premier Deng Xiaoping and Prime Minister Thatcher
met in September 1982, they agreed to enter negotiations on the
future of Hong Kong, with the goal of "maintaining the stability
and prosperity of Hong Kong." s Both China and Britain made im-
portant concessions in order to further that goal.
* Counsel, U.S. Senate Budget Committee, Washington, D.C.. B.A., Smith College,
1979; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1989. The author wishes to express her ap-
preciation to Professor James V. Feinerman and Kenneth Wong, Senior Contracts Specialist,
U.S. Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, for their guidance.
1. Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Future of
Hong Kong, Sept. 26, 1984, 1984 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 2352 (Cmd. 20), reprinted in 23 I.L.M.
1366 [hereinafter Joint Declaration]. The agreement is comprised of an introduction, the
Joint Declaration, three annexes, and two memoranda. These documents will be referred to
as the Joint Declaration. The terms "China" or "Chinese" will be used in this Article to
refer to the People's Republic of China.
2. After the Opium War, the island of Hong Kong was ceded in perpetuity by China
to Great Britain in the 1842 Treaty of Nanking. The southern Kowloon peninsula and Stone-
cutters Island were later acquired in 1860. The area of the Kwangtung province known as
the New Territories, located on the mainland opposite Hong Kong, was leased to Great Brit-
ain for ninety-nine years under the 1898 Convention of Peking. P. WESLEY-SMITH, UNEQUAL
TREATY 1898-1997 at xiii (1983); Recent Developments, 26 HARv. INT'L L.J. 249, 251
(1985) [hereinafter 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 249]; see Convention Between Great Britain and
China Respecting an Extension of Hong Kong Territory, June 9, 1898, reprinted in P. WES-
LEY-SMITH, supra, at 191 [hereinafter 1898 Convention of Peking]. The term "Hong Kong"
in this Article refers to Hong Kong Island, Kowloon and the New Territories.
3. Comment, Legal Aspects of the Sino-British Draft Agreement on the Future of
Hong Kong, 20 TEX. INT'L L.J. 167, 169 (1985) [hereinafter Comment, Legal Aspects]; Joint
Declaration, supra note 1, at 4, 23 I.L.M. at 1368. The Declaration was initialed on Septem-
ber 26, 1984, and signed on December 19, 1984. Ratifications were exchanged on May 27,
1985. Wesley-Smith, Settlement of the Question of Hong Kong, 17 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 116
(1987).
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As a prominent player in world trade and investment, Hong
Kong's future is important." Many United States and European
multinational corporations are located in Hong Kong.5 It is the
world's third largest financial and gold trading center and is the
source of one-third of the foreign currency earned by China
through trade." The growth of international business and multina-
tional corporations has affected the focus and development of politi-
cal and commercial attitudes in Hong Kong." It has also specifically
affected China's position on the future of democracy in Hong
Kong.
This Article will briefly analyze both the Joint Declaration and
the Basic Law,8 which is to be the "mini-constitution" that will
guide Hong Kong into the twenty-first century. Following a discus-
sion of the issues surrounding the "one country, two systems" con-
cept, the Article will conclude with an analysis of the impact that
China's relationship with Hong Kong could have on its position to-
wards Taiwan.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT
Hong Kong, a British Crown Colony, is presently ruled by a
Governor who is appointed by the British Crown.9 The governor in
turn appoints an Executive Council and a Legislative Council. 10
Despite this situation, the Chinese government has claimed for
years that Hong Kong is part of Chinese territory, that the three
treaties under which the British claim sovereignty over Hong Kong
are not binding on China because they are unequal, and that the
treaties have never been accepted by the Chinese people.11 As a
4. Comment, The Reversion of Hong Kong to China: Legal and Practical Questions,
21 WILLAMETTE L.R. 327 (1985) [hereinafter Comment, Reversion of Hong Kong].
5. id.
6. 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 249, supra note 2, at 252.
7. Comment, Reversion of Hong Kong, supra note 4, at 327.
8. The Basic Law will be promulgated by the National People's Congress of China,
and will stipulate and elaborate the policies provided in the Joint Declaration. Joint Declara-
tion, supra note 1, at 13, 23 I.L.M. at 1372.
9. 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 249, supra note 2, at 252. The Governor consults with the
Executive Council, which enacts laws with the advice and consent of the Legislative Counsel.
Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. Wesley-Smith, supra note 3, at 117 n.6; see also Joint Declaration, supra note
1, at 2, 23 I.L.M. at 1367. The three treaties referred to are the 1842 Treaty of Nanking,
ceding Hong Kong Island; the 1860 Convention of Peking, ceding Kowloon; and the 1898
Convention of Peking, leasing the New Territories to Great Britain. 26 HARV INT'L L.J. 249,
supra note 2, at 252; Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at 2, 23 I.L.M. at 1367; see also supra
note 2. Unequal treaties lack reciprocity and impose permanent or temporary burdens on one
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result, China vowed to recover the entire region of Hong Kong
when the appropriate situation materialized."2
The British government has, until the 1980s, continuously con-
tended that the treaties were valid under international law.13 Nev-
ertheless, the British government conceded that once the New Ter-
ritories were returned to China under the terms of the Convention
of 1898, the remaining portion of Hong Kong would "not be viable
alone."1"
II. THE JOINT DECLARATION
The Joint Declaration outlines the establishment of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR), under Chinese
sovereignty. The HKSAR will be self-governing, except in foreign
and defense affairs, and will preserve Hong Kong's current social
and economic systems for fifty years.' 5
What emerges from the Joint Declaration is a paper free of
Communist slogans and propaganda." From the Western perspec-
tive, it is a formal international agreement which transfers sover-
eignty over Hong Kong from Britain to China, yet also strictly lim-
its the extent to which China may exercise that sovereignty over
Hong Kong.' 7
China views international agreements as important sources of in-
ternational law, 8 however, whether a particular agreement is con-
sidered binding by China depends upon its substantive terms. 9 This
emphasis on substance derives from a number of international
agreements in which China was forced to accept unfavorable terms
due to military disadvantage.2 0 Accordingly, China does not recog-
of the parties. 2 H. GROTIus, DE JURE BELLI Ac PACIS LIBRIS TRES 394-97 (F. Kelsey trans.
1925). The Hong Kong treaties are considered unequal because there was no quid pro quo
received by China as compensation for the loss of territory, and the parties had unequal
bargaining power at the time the treaties were created. P. WELSEY-SMITH, supra note 2, at 3.
12. 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 249, supra note 2, at 253; Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at
2, 23 I.L.M. at 1367.
13. 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 249, supra note 2, at 253. The British interpreted the 1898
Convention of Peking as expanding British sovereignty to include the New Territories, ceded
for a term of years. P. WESLEY-SMITH, supra note 2, at 165-66.
14. Id. at xiii; Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at 9, 23 I.L.M. at 1370.
15. 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 249, supra note 2, at 249-50; Joint Declaration, supra note 1,
at 11-12, 23 I.L.M. at 1371-72.
16. Comment, Legal Aspects, supra note 3, at 170.
17. Id.
18. Corwin, China's Choices: The 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration and Its After-
math, 19 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 505, 510 (1987).
19. Id. at 511.
20. Id.
19891
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nize agreements that it believes are "unequal," or that infringe
upon the sovereign rights of one of the parties. 1
Yet, China has been inconsistent in applying the principle that
unequal treaties violate international law. This leads one to believe
that China's interpretation of treaties depends more on political ex-
pediency than on strict notions of international law.22 The Chinese
government has not explicitly stated that the Joint Declaration has
binding force,2a but it has indicated on several occasions that it in-
tends to abide by its terms.24
A. The Concessions
One basic principle underlies the terms of the Joint Declaration:
"[Tihe socialist system and socialist policies shall not be practiced
in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and ...Hong
Kong's previous capitalist system and life-style shall remain un-
changed for fifty years."28 Maintaining the prosperity and stability
of Hong Kong is the stated purpose of the Joint Declaration. 6
China and Britain each made significant compromises to achieve
that goal.2
7
For example, Britain recognized China's right to Kowloon and
Hong Kong Island although the nineteenth-century treaties ceded
these territories to Britain in perpetuity.28 This concession was nec-
essary to avoid dividing the New Territories from Kowloon and
Hong Kong Island, which would have resulted in the economic de-
mise of Hong Kong when the New Territories reverted to China
21. Id. An unequal treaty results when the sovereignty and equality of the parties is
not recognized during negotiations. It is argued that such treaties are void ab initio. A sec-
ond view is that unequal treaties are voidable due to inherent defects. The Chinese have
inconsistently applied both principles. However, when boundary agreements are at issue,
China has consistently recognized the validity of these unequal treaties until new negotia-
tions settle the problem in a fair manner. P. WELSEY-SMITH, supra note 2, at 184-85.
22. Corwin, supra note 18, at 514-15. Although China believes unequal treaties violate
international law, it also believes in peaceful co-existence. Therefore, as a matter of policy
China prefers to use negotiation to adjust the situation created by unequal treaties. P. WES-
LEY-SMITH, supra note 2, at 186.
23. Corwin, supra note 18, at 524.
24. Id. at 524-25. Corwin argues that the economic and international repercussions
that would result from a breach make it unlikely that China will renounce the Declaration.
However, China will be able to restrict the political independence of Hong Kong and still
remain in compliance with the Declaration. This means that Hong Kong may not enjoy the
degree of autonomy intended in the Declaration. See Corwin, supra note 18.
25. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at 14, 23 I.L.M. at 1373.
26. Id. at 2, 23 I.L.M. at 1367.
27. Comment, Legal Aspects, supra note 3, at 169.
28. Id.; see supra note 2.
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upon the expiration of Britain's lease in 1997.29
Britain also consented to transfer full sovereignty over Hong
Kong to China.30 Britain did not seek an assurance of a British
presence in Hong Kong after 1997 beyond the initial stages of the
negotiations."'
China was able to regain sovereignty only by agreeing to "pre-
serve the way of life in Hong Kong, together with the essentials of
the present systems." ' 2 By so agreeing, China acknowledged that
the value of its sovereignty over Hong Kong would decrease if the
present system was removed. 83 Britain also required China to de-
velop policies regarding Hong Kong in a clear, detailed manner. 34
It is believed that an agreement that merely pronounced principles
instead of laying out a specific course of action would have been
condemned by Hong Kong residents and by the international
community."3 5
Although Hong Kong will be able to enact its own social, eco-
nomic, and legal policies, there is a sentiment of frustration among
the Hong Kong populace because they were not consulted during
the negotiations resulting in the Joint Declaration which decided
their fate. 6 Even the Hong Kong government, in which citizens
had no electoral participation, played no role in the treaty-making
process.37 The Governor participated in the process, but solely as a
29. Id. at 170; Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at 9, 23 I.L.M. at 1370; P. WESLEY-
SMITH, supra note 2, at xiii. Without this concession, Kowloon and Hong Kong would have
remained under British rule pursuant to the Treaty of Nanking and the Convention of Pe-
king. Comment, Legal Aspects, supra note 3, at 170. However since Hong Kong is depen-
dant on the 350 square miles comprising the New Territories, the economy of the region
could not survive once the lease expired. P. WESLEY-SMITH, supra note 2, at xiii.
30. Comment, Legal Aspects, supra note 3, at 170; Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at
11, 23 I.L.M. at 1371.
31. Comment, Legal Aspects, supra note 3, at 170. China made it clear that the con-
tinuation of British administration after 1997 would be unacceptable. Joint Declaration,
supra note 3, at 4, 23 I.L.M. at 1368.
32. Id. at 5, 23 I.L.M. at 1368. The main concern was to maintain the "flourishing
and dynamic society" of Hong Kong. Id.
33. Comment, Legal Aspects, supra note 3, at 170; see also Corwin supra note 18, at
519-24.
34. Comment, Legal Aspects, supra note 3, at 170; see also Joint Declaration, supra
note 1, at 13, 23 I.L.M. at 1372.
35. Comment, Legal Aspects, supra note 3, at 170.
36. Wesley-Smith, supra note 3, at 117; see also Weng, The Hong Kong Model of
"One Country, Two Systems"; Promises & Problems 3 (Oct. 23, 1987) (prepared for the
29th Annual Meeting of the American Association of Chinese Studies, Washington, D.C.).
The Declaration itself states that the agreement must be acceptable to the people of Hong
Kong, as well as the British and Chinese governments. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at 5,
23 I.L.M. at 1368. However, no formal referendum was held.
37. Wesley-Smith, supra note 3, at 117.
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member of the British negotiating team.3"
The terms of the Joint Declaration were debated in the terri-
tory's Legislative Council, of which the members were all ap-
pointed.39 An "Assessment Office" set up under the Hong Kong
government reported on the opinions of the Hong Kong public.4
There was no referendum, no poll and no direct vote. The future of
Hong Kong was settled by the governments of China and Great
Britain alone. 1 Hong Kong's six million inhabitants were presented
with the Declaration on a fait accompli basis."'
B. Structure of the New Government
Britain will be responsible for the administration of Hong Kong
until June 30, 1997. After that time, the Joint Declaration provides
for a Sino-British Joint Liaison Group to assist in the smooth trans-
fer of sovereignty."' This group will exchange information and con-
duct consultations on subjects agreed to by the parties." It will
serve only in an advisory capacity and will not be involved in the
administration of Hong Kong.' 5 The group will consist of two sen-
ior representatives of ambassadorial rank from both Britain and
China, and four other members from each country."
After the British withdraw, the Joint Declaration assures that
China will maintain a capitalist system in an area of what will be-
come its own sovereign territory.'7 This is the phenomenon known
as "one country, two systems." It will be accomplished by prescrib-
ing the new governmental structure while preserving the current
socio-economic system in Hong Kong, at least until June 30,
38. Id.; Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at 6, 23 I.L.M. at 1369.
39. Wesley-Smith, supra note 3, at 117.
40. Id. The Assessment Office was set up to receive comments by the Hong Kong
populace regarding the agreement. The results were reported to the British Government and
Parliament, which then debated whether to accept the Declaration. See Joint Declaration,
supra note 1, at 9-10, 23 I.L.M. at 1370-71.
41. Wesley-Smith, supra note 3, at 117.
42. Id.
43. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at 26, 23 I.L.M. at 1379. The group will meet in
Beijing, Hong Kong, and London. Id. at 27, 23 I.L.M. at 1379. It will continue its work until
January 1, 2000. Id. r
44. Id. at 26, 23 I.L.M. at 1379. Matters to be considered by the group include: ena-
bling the HKSAR to maintain its economic status as a separate customs territory; ensuring
Hong Kong's continued participation in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the
Multi-Fiber Agreement, and other international agreements; and assisting the HKSAR in
developing economic and cultural relations with other states. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 27, 23 I.L.M. at 1379. Each side is permitted to have twenty supporting
staff. Id.
47. 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 249, supra note 2, at 253.
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2047.4
The new leaders of Hong Kong will continue to maintain and
develop economic and cultural relations and to conclude certain
agreements with states, regions, and international organizations.49
Under the Joint Declaration, Hong Kong shall retain the rights and
freedoms guaranteed under previous law, including freedom of the
person, speech, press, assembly, association, travel, movement, cor-
respondence, strike, choice of occupation, academic research, and
religious belief.50 Private property, ownership of enterprises, the le-
gitimate right of inheritance and foreign investments will also be
protected by law.51 The Hong Kong dollar will remain the basic
unit of currency.52 And the territory will continue to be a separate
unit for customs, immigration and passport purposes."
C. The Powers of the HKSAR
1. Internal Affairs
The HKSAR is designed to possess a high degree of autonomy in
internal matters. The HKSAR will have full control of its own gov-
ernment finances." Its revenues will be used exclusively for its own
purposes.55 The Central People's Government may not levy taxes on
HKSAR residents. s
2. Foreign Affairs
The HKSAR will have very limited powers in foreign relations.
Under the name "Hong Kong, China," it may maintain and de-
velop relations and implement agreements with foreign states and
relevant international organizations in "appropriate" fields, such as
economic, trade, financial and monetary areas. 57 Hong Kong,
China will be able to participate directly in international organiza-
48. Id. at 253.
49. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at 12, 23 I.L.M. at 1372.
50. Id. at 23, 23 I.L.M. at 1375.
51. Id. at 18, 23 I.L.M. at 1375.
52. Id. at 19, 23 I.L.M. at 1375.
53. Id. at 18, 23-24, 23 I.L.M. at 1375, 1377-78. A complete statement of the policies
that will remain in effect in Hong Kong is contained in Annex I to the Joint Declaration. See
id. at 14-25, 23 I.L.M. at 1373-78.
54. Id. at 17, 23 I.L.M. at 1374.
55. Id. The systems for approval of taxation and public expenditure by the legislature
shall be maintained. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id at 21-22, 23 I.L.M. at 1376-77.
19891
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tions and conferences that are not limited to States. 6
In the past, Hong Kong has had an independent voice in the
General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), an important
means of access to world markets.59 China specifically indicated in
the Declaration that Hong Kong will be able to maintain member-
ship in organizations such as GATT, the Multi-Fiber Agreement
(MFA), and the Asian Development Bank.60
However, what happens if China also becomes a member of these
organizations?61 China's new role could diminish the autonomy of
Hong Kong.62 The relative status of China and Hong Kong may be
crucial in the case of a trade dispute.6 8 Whatever the situation, re-
negotiations of GATT and MFA agreements after 1997 will be
complicated.14
3. Defense Capabilities
The HKSAR will have very limited defense capabilities. The
Declaration permits the Central People's Government to perma-
nently install military forces in the HKSAR for the purpose of de-
fense.65 The Declaration makes it clear, however, that the military
forces may not interfere in the legislative, executive and indepen-
dent judicial power of the HKSAR.66 The costs for such forces will
be borne by the Central People's Government.67
58. Id. at 22, 23 I.L.M. at 1377.
59. Comment, Reversion of Hong Kong, supra note 4, at 339.
60. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at 22, 23 I.L.M. at 1377; see also id. at 26, 23
I.L.M. at 1379. The MFA was established under GATT to regulate textile trading. Com-
ment, Reversion of Hong Kong, supra note 4, at 339; see also Corwin, supra note 18, at 521.
61. Comment, Reversion of Hong Kong, supra note 4, at 339.
62. Id.
63. Id. For instance, China already is a member of the MFA. Quotas are established
in bilateral agreements between MFA members. Hong Kong's present advantage may be
challenged by importing nations anxious to protect their own industry who may insist on
handling Hong Kong and China as one source. As a result, China may seek an increase in its
own export quotas at the expense of Hong Kong. Id.
64. Id.
65. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at 23, 23 I.L.M. at 1377.
66. Id.
The maintenance of public order in the Hong Kong [SARI shall be the responsibil-
ity of the Hong Kong [SARI Government. Military forces sent by the Central Peo-
ple's Government to be stationed in the Hong Kong [SARI for the purpose of de-
fense shall not interfere in the internal affairs of the Hon Kong [SAR]. Expenditure
for these military forces shall be borne by the Central People's Government.
Id.
67. Id.
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III. THE BASIC LAW OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
The laws of the HKSAR will be comprised of the Basic Law
promulgated by China according to the terms of the Declaration,
and the laws enacted by the Hong Kong legislature in accordance
with the Basic Law and legal procedures.18 Except when in conflict
with the Basic Law, the laws currently in force in Hong Kong will
be effective, although subject to legislative amendment.6 9
The most immediate question prompted by the Joint Declaration
arises in relation to the constitutional structure of the HKSAR.70
The actual separation of powers as discussed in the Joint Declara-
tion does have some ambiguities. 1 It establishes an executive
branch that will function under the influence of the National Peo-
ple's Congress of China, a legislative branch that will respond to
the demands of the local Hong Kong population, and a judicial sys-
tem that will function with "special ties" to the United Kingdom. 2
The Declaration does not seem to provide the legislature with the
necessary power to exercise checks and balances.7 1
The Declaration states that the first chief executive will be ap-
pointed by the Central People's Government, on the basis of results
of local consultations or elections.74 The chief executive will be se-
lected by a Nominating Committee, whose members will be se-
lected by a Preparatory Committee, whose members in turn will be
appointed by the Central People's Government. 76 At least half of
the members of each committee will be chosen from Hong Kong;
but a high-ranking official from the Central People's Government
68. Id. at 15; 23 I.L.M. at 1373. The Basic Law will be promulgated by the National
People's Congress of China in accordance with the Chinese Constitution. Id. at 14, 23 I.L.M.
at 1373. The Basic Law will be comprised of the policies stipulated in the Joint Declaration.
Id at 13, 23 I.L.M. at 1372.
69. Id. at 15, 23 I.L.M. at 1373.
70. 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 249, supra note 2, at 261.
71. Id. at 262.
72. Id. at 261. See Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at 14-16, 23 I.L.M. at 1373-74. Of
course, officially all ties with the United Kingdom will be broken in 1997. However the
judiciary will retain "special ties" because it is permitted to decide cases by referring to
precedents in other common law jurisdiction. See id. at 16, 23 I.L.M. at 1374.
73. In 1987, Chairman Deng Xiaoping declared that a separation of powers between
the executive, legislative and judiciary, as well as elections for a representative assembly, was
unsuitable for Hong Kong because it was not a country. Now, Down to Basics, Far Eastern
Economic Review, Apr. 30, 1987, at 12, col. 1.
74. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at 14-15, 23 I.L.M. at 1373; see also id. at 12, 23
I.L.M. at 1372.
75. Lee, The Basic Law for Hong Kong-Will It Bring About "One County, Two
Systems?" 10 (Apr. 12, 1987) (unpublished material).
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will act as Chairman.76
The Joint Declaration states that the HKSAR will have the
power to set its own policies in many areas, yet at the same time
also details just what those policies will be.7 The rules provided in
the Joint Declaration will all be stipulated in the Basic Law, and
the HKSAR policies must conform to this constitutional instru-
ment.7 8 It is unclear whether the Hong Kong judiciary will have the
power to review legislation that conflicts with the Basic Law." This
uncertainty could affect the preservation of the capitalist system
and the protection of civil rights and liberties.8"
The legislature of the HKSAR can enact laws on its own author-
ity and without the assent of the chief executive.8 ' The new legisla-
ture will be elected, enfranchising the citizens of Hong Kong for
the first time.82 However, the Joint Declaration fails to indicate the
manner in which elections will be conducted. 83
One proposed electoral method is referred to as the Grand Elec-
toral College (GEC). The members of GEC would come from vari-
ous sectors of the community in stated proportions.84 The majority
of the GEC members would be under the influence, if not the con-
trol, of the Central People's Government, or its agents in Hong
Kong.85 The GEC's effect would be to undermine the present ap-
pointment system, under which the Governor of Hong Kong ap-
points the legislative members.8" In the GEC system there would be
a large body of "appointers. '87 The majority of the appointers
would act as directed by the Central People's Government.88 The
GEC concept appears to be in conflict with the Joint Declaration,
which requires that the legislature of the HKSAR be selected by
elections.89
While the Joint Declaration leaves open the method of the legis-
lature's election, it carefully safeguards the independence of the ju-
76. Id.
77. 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 249, supra note 2, at 262.
78. Id.
79. Id.; see infra text accompanying note 92.
80. Id.
81. Id.; Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at 15, 23 I.L.M. at 1373.
82. 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 249, supra note 2, at 262.
83. Id.
84. Lee, supra note 75, at 9.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.; see Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at 15, 23 I.L.M. at 1373.
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diciary.90 China promised that the judiciary will be independent,
and the court of final appeal will be in Hong Kong, not Beijing.91
The laws of Hong Kong will basically remain unchanged in spite of
wide differences with Chinese law. 2 Neither present law nor future
enactments may contravene the Basic Law, which will act as a
mini-constitution for Hong Kong." A veto power is not specifically
provided for in the Declaration, however, the National People's
Congress will probably act as interpreter of the constitutional valid-
ity of the Hong Kong statutes, rather than the Hong Kong
judiciary. 4
It is unclear how long China will maintain a hands-off policy to-
wards Hong Kong. 5 In 1985, Ji Pengfei, China's State Councilor
of the Government Office of Hong Kong and Macao Affairs, said
that laws of a "colonial nature or detrimental to China" would be
changed.98 And China has asserted it will ensure that legislation is
responsive to all interests-pro-China, pro-Britain and neutral.97
Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping has commented that the Hong Kong
patriots who will run the HKSAR need not all favor China's social-
ist system as long as they love the motherland and Hong Kong.98
The question remains as to whether China can enact adequate
guarantees to reassure the people of Hong Kong that their way of
90. 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 249, supra note 2, at 262; see Joint Declaration, supra note 1,
at 37, 23 I.L.M. at 1383.
The independent exercise of judicial power and obligation of the courts to decide
cases in accordance with the law are both provided for.... [The Declaration] also
provides that the appointment of judges in the [HKSAR] will be subject to the
recommendation of an independent commission similar to the existing Judicial Ser-
vice Commission. The independence of the judiciary is protected by the provisions
that judges of the SAR may only be removed from office on the grounds of inability
or misbehavior, and then only on the recommendation of a tribunal of judges of the
SAR.
The Annex provides that the essentials of the system of appointment and removal
of judges will remain unchanged, but the appointment and removal of judges of the
highest rank will require the endorsement of the legislature of the [HKSAR] and
have to be reported for the record to the Standing Committee of the National Peo-
ple's Congress.
Id.
91. Id. at 11, 15,23 I.L.M. at 1371, 1373. At present the court of final appeal is now
the Privy Council in London. The Declaration establishes a new court of final appeal in
Hong Kong. Comment, Reversion of Hong Kong, supra note 4, at 340.
92. Id.; see Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at 11, 23 I.L.M. at 1371.
93. Comment, Reversion of Hong Kong, supra note 4, at 340; see Joint Declaration,
supra note 1, at 15, 23 I.L.M. at 1373.
94. Comment, Reversion of Hong Kong, supra note 4, at 340.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 347. "The HKSAR would be administered by the Hong Kong people, but
they must love Hong Kong and China." Now, Down to Basics, supra note 73, at 12.
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life will not be altered, and whether China will maintain those
guarantees if its interests change.99 The confidence of the people of
Hong Kong is imperative for successful implementation of the Joint
Declaration. 0 "
IV. REUNIFICATION WITH TAIWAN
The Chinese government's three principal objectives are: eco-
nomic reform; independence from both the Soviet Union and the
United States; and reunification with Taiwan. 10' Over the past sev-
eral years China has pressed Taiwan to enter into reunification dis-
cussions. As soon as the Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed
in September 1984, Deng Xiaoping expressed his willingness to
adopt the Hong Kong model of "one country, two systems" to re-
solve the Taiwan issue. 02 He indicated that complete unification
might take longer than even one hundred years, but that the "one
country, two systems" policy was an enlightened alternative to al-
lowing the issue to be resolved by non-peaceful means.'03
China's renewed interest in Taiwan stems from several factors.
Before the completion of the Joint Declaration, Chinese leaders
were concerned about the successor to Taiwan's President Chiang
Ching-kuo. 04 When Chiang Ching-kuo's successor, Lee Teng-hui,
came into power in early 1988, China expressed concern about the
next generation of Kuomintang (KMT) leaders. 105 China under-
stands, but does not appreciate, the conflicts between the KMT
leaders and the native Taiwanese.'0 6 It fears that Lee might lead
Taiwan in the direction of independence.
China was much more comfortable with Chiang Ching-kuo, be-
cause he worked towards the reunification of Taiwan with the
99. Comment, Reversion of Hong Kong, supra note 4, at 347.
100. Id.
101. Huan, Taiwan. A View from Beijing, 63 FOREIGN AFF. 1064, 1066 (1985). The
term "Taiwan" will be used in this Article to refer to the Republic of China.
102. Id. "Deng said in 1987 that without reunification, Taiwan's status would not be
secured because the island might at some time be taken away by other countries, such as the
United States or Japan." Now, Down to Basics, supra note 73, at 12.
103. Jiaquan, Formula for China's Reunification, BEIJING REV., Feb. 3, 1986, at 25.
Deng stated: "The reunification of China is a national desire, and it if is not realized in one
hundred years it will be in one thousand years. This goal, in my opinion, can only be reached
by using the 'one country, two systems' concept." Id.
104. Huan, supra note 101, at 1067. Chiang Ching-Kuo is the son of the late Chinese
leader Chiang Kai-shek. Id. at 1069. Chiang Ching-Kuo is also known as Jiang Jingguo. Id.
105. Beijing, a Message of Condolence to Taiwan, Praises Chiang Ching-kuo, Wash.
Post., Jan. 15, 1988, at A27, col. 1. The KMT is the Chinese Nationalist Party; the govern-
ment party of Taiwan.
106. Id. at col. 4.
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mainland."0 7 Chiang strongly believed in the unification of China
and Taiwan, even though he rejected the Communists' plans to
achieve this goal. 08 The commitment of Taiwan's new president to
reunification with the mainland is much less certain. 09 The KMT's
position is that there should be no contact, no compromise, and no
negotiations with China. 10 The Chinese would rather deal with
their old enemy, Chiang, than with the new leaders who, unlike
Chiang, were not born on the Chinese mainland and have less of an
attachment to it."' China's assessment is that Lee Teng-hui has
little real power and will have to act with great caution on sensitive
issues such as reunification." 2
China has shown a willingness to provide even more favorable
conditions to Taiwan than it has to Hong Kong." 3 This is because
Taiwan and Hong Kong are different in several important areas.
First, Taiwan is much larger in size and population than Hong
Kong. Therefore it carries considerable weight in the eyes of China,
Washington, and Hong Kong." 4 Second, Taiwan is an island geo-
graphically separated from the mainland." 5 Consequently, it is eas-
ier to defend against military invasions. Third, Taiwan, unlike
Hong Kong, has been self-governing for over three decades." 6
Fourth, Taiwan has maintained its own armed forces and indepen-
dent international ties during this period of self-government." 7 Tai-
wan is an international personality still recognized by twenty-four
countries as the Republic of China, and it maintains substantive
relations with some 140 countries around the world." 8 Fifth, unlike
107. Id. at col. 5. Taiwan strongly believes in a one-China policy. Since ancient times,
China has been unified, with an unbroken line of cultural identity. Struggles among political
groups in Chinese history often involve competing claims to represent all of China. Shaw,
Taiwan: A View from Taipei, 63 FOREIGN AFF. 1050, 1053 (1985). "Under the burden of
Chinese history neither [China] nor [Taiwan] could dare to deviate from the one-China con-
cept and still claim legitimacy as a Chinese entity." Id. at 1053-54.
108. Beijing, a Message of Condolence to Taiwan, supra note 105, at ol. 5.
109. Id.
110. Id. This is known as the policy of the "Three Nos." There is a trend towards
liberalizing this policy, due to the ongoing political and economic reforms in China, and the
positive influence of scholarly exchanges. Huan, supra note 101, at 1065-66.
111. Beijing, A Message of Condolence to Taiwan, supra note 105, at col. 5; see also
Taiwan in Transition, Wall St. J., Jan. 15, 1988, at 18, col. 1. In October of 1987, President
Chiang stated that he was not looking to reunification by military force, but to the hope that
a free and democratic Taiwan might someday show all of China a way out of its agony.
112. Beijing: A Message of Condolence to Taiwan, supra note 105, at col. 5.
113. Huan, supra note 101, at 1066.
114. Weng, supra note 36, at 8.
115. Huan, supra note 101, at 1066.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Weng, supra note 36, at 8.
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Hong Kong, the island does not depend on the mainland for food,
water, and other basic supplies.' 19 Finally, not only are the
Taiwanese taught to despise the communists, but an overwhelming
majority of them have never set foot on the mainland and do not
have personal memories or any real emotional attachment to the
mainland. 2 '
Many issues remain unanswered regarding China's continued in-
terest in Taiwan. China has promised that Taiwan would be al-
lowed to maintain its armed services after reunification-yet it is
unclear whether Taiwan would be allowed to import weapons. 2'
Taiwan's future position in the international community is also un-
certain. 22 Thus, China's pressure for reunification has so far pro-
voked no receptive response from Taiwan. 123
China's experiences with Hong Kong will be valuable in dealing
with the even more complex issues facing reunification with Tai-
wan. 2" Taiwan looks to Hong Kong as a test of China's policy in-
tentions. 12 5 It will be closely scrutinizing China's behavior in the
years before the end of British control of Hong Kong.'26 China's
progress could encourage Taiwan to accept a similar moderate
approach. 2 7
V. THE CONCEPT OF "ONE COUNTRY, Two SYSTEMS"
The general principle behind the "one country, two systems"
concept is to ensure the stability and prosperity of all regions, while
simultaneously giving due consideration to the interests of all sec-
tions of society and protecting the interests of both foreign and
overseas Chinese investors.' 28 Legally, the concept is approved in
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Huan, supra note 101, at 1068. For example, the Taiwan Air Force has a fleet of
Northrop's F-5E/F aircraft. When Northrop built the F-20 to replace the F-5E/F, questions
were raised as to whether the United States would sell the new planes to Taiwan. One reason
for this uncertainty stems from the fact that Washington broke official ties with Taiwan in
order to recognize China. See also Shaw, supra note 107, at 1061.
122. Huan, supra note 101, at 1068.
123. Id. Initially Taiwan indicated it would not recognize the Joint Declaration. Tai-
wan considers itself to be the legitimate government of China, and so it believes the Declara-
tion was not negotiated between the proper parties. Shaw, supra note 107, at 1055.
124. Huan, supra note 101, at 1068. Taiwan also believes Hong Kong can act as a
springboard to bring capitalist, free-enterprise, and democratic influence to China. Shaw,
supra note 107, at 1055.
125. Huan, supra note 101, at 1068.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Jiaquan, supra note 103, at 19. This would mean that after peaceful reunifica-
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the Chinese Constitution, which stipulates that special administra-
tive regions may be established when necessary, indicating that
China has incorporated its policies on Taiwan and Hong Kong into
its fundamental law. 129
China developed the concept of "one country, two systems" with
history, as well as contemporary conditions, in mind. 1a0 The concept
is also connected to the theory of building socialism with Chinese
characteristics.131 The present focus of China's economic policy is
on a modernization drive centered around economic construction. 32
China is taking steps to develop its productive forces.133 Implement-
ing the "one country, two systems" method will help accomplish
the Party's economic goals, and therefore will not be changed at
random.13" Practicing socialism in the mainland and simultaneously
allowing capitalism to exist in Hong Kong and Taiwan is beneficial
to the entire country's economic development.133 Hong Kong, Tai-
wan and China have each achieved different levels of economic pro-
gress and success. Proponents of the "one country, two systems"
concept believe that this approach will permit each area to work
together to compensate for the other's deficiencies. 3 6
The concept of "one country, two systems," as advocated by the
Communist Party of China and the Chinese government, was an
important means of resolving the Hong Kong issue in 1984.137
China's reunification with Taiwan could follow the same approach.
Many commenters believe this approach is feasible because, among
other things, Taiwan would be allowed to keep its armed forces.13 '
The future of Hong Kong and Taiwan is uncertain once reunifi-
cation takes place. The Joint Declaration calls for capitalism to
continue in Hong Kong for fifty years and no doubt any agreement
between Taiwan and China must do the same. But can these re-
gions remain capitalist after reunification? Each proposal calls for
tion, Taiwan and Hong Kong would maintain capitalism, while China practices socialism.
The two systems would coexist peacefully. Id. at 18-19.
129. Id. at 19. The Constitution states: "[Tihe state may establish special administra-
tive regions when necessary. The systems to be instituted in special administrative regions
shall be prescribed by laws enacted by the National People's Congress in light of the specific
conditions." CHINA CONST. art. 31.
130. Jiaquan, supra note 103, at 19.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 22.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 18.
136. Id. at 22.
137. Id. at 18.
138. Id.
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local capitalist systems. In the case of Hong Kong, such a system
would operate under a communist central system. Hence this com-
munist central system would regulate any progress in, or digression
from, capitalism. China has said that once reunification is achieved,
Taiwan would still practice capitalism, while the mainland main-
tains socialism. 139 But it is argued that the duration of a capitalist
system is limited and Taiwan will be predestined to adapt to social-
ism if reunification is realized.
CONCLUSION
The unification of Hong Kong and China in 1997 will provide a
testing ground for the "one country, two systems" government.
There are three serious concerns about the Joint Declaration, how-
ever, that may .hinder its viability if they are not addressed. First,
the lack of participation by the Hong Kong populace in drafting
the Declaration has caused hard feelings between the inhabitants of
Hong Kong and China. This could lead to possible mistrust of
China's policies. Second, it may be difficult for the HKSAR to ex-
ercise the high degree of autonomy promised to it under the Decla-
ration. Third, the intention to maintain Hong Kong's previous capi-
talist system and life-style for fifty years is noble, but not likely
unless specific steps are outlined to achieve this goal.
The policy of "one country, two systems" may not work to re-
unify Hong Kong and China, and its applicability to Taiwan's
reunification with China is also questionable. China's present so-
cialist system will not change in the future. However, if the capital-
ist systems in Hong Kong and Taiwan are not guaranteed, stability
and prosperity cannot be maintained and peaceful settlement will
become impossible.1"" In Hong Kong, China must guarantee that
the present capitalist system and life-style will remain unchanged
until 2047. Then Taiwan must be persuaded that Hong Kong's ex-
perience accurately represents China's intention for Taiwan. Once
this goodwill is developed, contacts, trade, interchange, and mutual
understanding must be developed before the two countries can en-
gage in serious discussions about reunification.
139. Id. at 25. Deng Xiaoping insists China will abide by the "one country, two sys-
tems" concept. He notes that the concept is "a principle and a law adopted by the National
People's Congress. Therefore it will not change. The key is whether this policy is correct or
incorrect. If it is correct, nobody can change it. Otherwise, it should be changed." Id.
140. Id. (statement by Deng Xiaoping).
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